Friday, July 24, 2015

Livin' On Tulsa Time--got a lot of catching up to do in Enid

Took some time off to see the big wingding over at Tulsa's Philbrook Art Museum where they were celebrating the art of someone associated with the movie Grand Budapest Hotel and I'm just now draggin' my tailbone in to make a short post about that, and I know it's been a while since my last post.

Just going to post this brief update for now, and will go into more depth tomorrow or something.  And just to say that there's just something special about some ghosts that just don't go away with time, or with distance (this, too, was in Tulsa, and it was just today)...

Regular readers of this blog already know that I'm a big Walter Van Brunt fan, so there ya go, folks.  And don't be misled by the word "Re-Creation" on the label, this is NOT a latter-day remake fake. What you see here is a genuine Diamond Disk, and that's the kind of player he's referring to.

Here's another gem at his location--a Victrola after Victor was spun off by Emile Berliner, but before RCA took over:

Detail shots...

So yeah, like so many of the other trips I take, this one definitely turned out to be an adventure.

Mid-August Postscript: This just in at the local thrift shop:

Mechanical volume control that variably mutes the horn.  Now, that speed adjusting mechanism looks like an easy fix from my vantage point.  It appears to me that the knob's pointer needs to be atop that pin.

Ongoing UPDATE: The gent in the above video also stated that he had a large collection of 78 rpm records and some cylinders, which he donated to Tulsa's Gilcrease Museum, and that Gilcrease did indeed have a laser player for them.  Therefore it's official--I'm going to visit Gilcrease again, with that specifically in mind, and, as you might guess, with Walter Van Brunt specifically in mind, ha.

As for my latest trip to Tulsa, here are some visuals from the Philbrook Museum:

They were sponsoring a free-to-the-public event in the garden, for which this was one of numerous announcements:

Got there early myself, and below was the scene as guests started filing in after 7 pm.  And they were still coming in by droves when I took this pic:

Left early to beat the stampede, only to discover that the optimum parking spot I found below the top deck of the parking area meant that upon exit, I had to drive by the loads of overflow parking out on the streets, and that extended for many blocks!  Wow.

The Philbrook gardens are just spectacular all year 'round, and the setting sun put a gilded edge on things besides. Breathtakingly gorgeous out there.

Gilcrease, on the other hand, sustained significant storm damage, and one of the galleries that got hit was their awesome Vista Room.  It was empty of displays but it wasn't closed off to the public as a couple of other of their galleries were.

Sometimes having electronic eyeballs in the form of a camera can be applied to great advantage in this situation on the main floor of Gilcrease:

...because with electronic eyeballs, you can get a much closer look...

One of the many things that makes Gilcrease cool is that they have an open-to-the-public archaeology section down in the basement, and you can bet I went down there, too.

Another iron in the fire is tracking down what the hell happened to Enid TV station, KXOK, and so far from the FCC I found a license, but it expired in June 2014, and it's also on an FCC list of translators. Something is badly screwed up somewhere.

....but back to Gilcrease, actively involving both kids and adults in some interesting historical venues including archaeology, and some of this stuff Gilcrease does is of relatively recent vintage.

Some of these would do better as an archaeology category, IMHO...

Because Blogger continues to have unreasonable restrictions on blog videos, I'm posting the next one without audio, hoping that it doesn't get rejected in mp2 format...and it got rejected, dammit. Converting it to Windows Media format, then, but there's still no audio.  It shows a glimpse of what's in the basement, in the Kravis Discovery Center, important in conjunction with the recent opening of its Helmerich Center dedicated to the history of the Americas.

It's been long, LONG overdue for Oklahoma to get serious about its French history and the only museum that looks like it's doing any kind of good in that department is Gilcrease.  Anyway, here's the vid in stinky Windows WMV format so expect blurry detail--I'll have to come up with something else, I suppose, but not just right now. Meh.

Thursday, July 16, 2015

Before passing judgment, read it first--directive re: Iran Deal plus UPDATE

January 16 2016 UPDATE:  Iran has reached IAEA compliance point
It's the #IranDeal which is credited with the peaceful release of U.S. Navy sailors found drifting in Iranian waters, marking a major departure from Iran's typical actions of the past--PLUS five U.S. citizens already held by Iran have been released.  That last bit was a surprise bonus, but less of a surprise when the State Department described its negotiations related to how Congress threatened to hold up sanctions relief on their account.  The State Department basically threatened Iran with  Congress if it didn't let those citizens go.  I don't think that's what Congress had in mind, so it's just desserts on both counts!

Implementation Day Has Arrived (Egypt & MENA Updates)

December 17, 2015 UPDATE:  Against UN resolutions, Iran test-launched a ballistic missile quite some time ago and the U.S. is taking its sweet time mulling over what sanctions to take, given the #IranDeal it signed on to.  Reuters article LINK

A few points:
  •  The Iran Deal is a nuclear agreement that excludes the military's customary non-nuke exercises.
  • If the globe expects Iran's military to continue to attack Daesh and further, work in concert with the rest of the globe's efforts against Daesh, it's necessary to cut Iran military slack.  The senators which signed the letter to the President demanding reinstating sanctions erstwhile lifted under the Iran Deal also seek to protect Daesh.
Seriously--the senators who make such demands shoot from the hip without thinking about their aim first.

August 28 UPDATE, Twitter Edition: The White House is doing Q & A on Twitter under the hashtag   ...and I did mention the missing Attachments thereby.  Twice.  We'll see what happens.

At the end of the day, it matters not to Europe whether or not the U.S. approves:

France 24 re: Russia & Iran now in talks joined by the UK who doesn't care what Congress does either...

Mini-UPDATE up at the top: I'm going to post links in this section to articles written by people who have actually read the document and rebuts a lot of the false claims floating around out there about the #IranDeal such as:

Why the IAEA prohibits U.S. info on "side deals"  and on the same issue, THIS article.
About the tricky business of sanctions, WaPo article.
About the nonsense of holding out for a better deal, TPM article.
MIT weighs in.
Secretary Lew's Iran Deal primer

Anti-Deal Gary Samore switches sides to support it--The Takeaway
Fareed Zakaria's Take--a letter
Jonathan Alter's take (WaPo)

Stay tuned.

I know that my international audience has been monitoring this blog of late, with the end of Ramadan in sight, too, and I haven't posted a comment on the Iran Deal as yet.  Well, I'm trying to read it first.  But one must also consider the geopolitical geocommercial aspects of this agreement as well and on that account I am loath to pass quick judgment as well.  I will add commentary to this post as developments warrant, but not before--so by all means, stay tuned.

Iran Agreement text--PDF

Meanwhile, for my Muslim friends...

I'm going to place this clarification up at the top of this section because of the number of people who have already read this and wonder why I commented on U.S. exclusion from the main body of the agreement although it's mentioned as a member of the Joint Commission and the agreement is between the E3/EU+3, and it is a fact that in the part that is the EU+3, the U.S. is one of the 3. What I mean is that the U.S. is just one nation among equals, not in a position to make a decision that it can make binding on the other members--as a member, the U.S. doesn't enjoy more privilege than its other members but if it should drop out, it loses advantage of its position as a member including the ability to supervise Iran. I'm just saying that even if the Congress throws its biggest tantrum and succeeds in pulling out the U.S., this agreement still goes forward regardless, as the agreement is not between Iran and specifically the U.S..

Now let's look at the actual document, and get real about this thing (this segment will be a work in progress, as progress through the document occurs, so by all means stay tuned).

Blaming the entire deal just on the U.S. President alone is a FAIL at the outset.  The next president, whomever that may be, can't just go to Congress and nullify this thing without also bringing along the E3/EU+3.  This is what a set of governments agreed to and even an attempt at nullification will also alienate our allies.

Next is the part of the Preface that I'm sure spooks the political fraidycats in the U.S. government, but it's just a statement of the end goal of the initiative even if it's numerous increments along the way into the distant future, which is why it's called the Joint COMPREHENSIVE Plan of Action (JCPOA)...

The Preamble and General Provisions is an itemized list of generalized goals implemented pertaining to the achievement of the previously stated general goal, listing 9 goals, with the remaining 17 items generally describing steps, over time. The whining I've heard pertains to the statement of goal Item 10 (x) regarding how Iran gets to give permission and gets to deny access for inspections. I repeat that the document thusfar covered here is a statement of what the end goals are, not what we can expect to begin with.  We're at the beginning, and with the rebuttal that we, the EU+3+the U.S., get to inspect suppliers from which Iran might purchase the materials even if Iran does act in bad faith, and there's been some reference to "snap back provisions" available to the group when enforcement is required, so without having arrived at that section of text yet, the claim is that this agreement includes enforcement provisions rather than a reliance on a presumed good faith effort by Iran.

The next screenshot pertains to the people whining about a number of other things they think should have been included in this agreement but weren't, like the freeing of Americans imprisoned in Iran:

Section 11 doesn't mention the U.S. as part of this agreement, so the idiots running for President of the U.S. screaming about how they're going to negate U.S. obligations in this agreement are just butt trumpets.

Seriously--in order to negate any U.S. obligations under this agreement one would have to negate U.S. alliances and membership in NATO, among others, because those are the obligations that apply here, and where the U.S is mentioned as having a commitment, it's entirely in the sanctions department mentioned in an Annex: Annex II, which begins at the bottom of page 50. And the U.S. is mentioned in Annex IV, page 144, as a member of a joint commission; ripping up the agreement means that others without the U.S. participates in this joint commission, a basically stupid move.

Yup, this agreement itself is just Step One, and what do you wanna bet all the whiners skipped over the Preface and Preamble just to look for faults to find first?  Betcha, you betcha.

Now--keeping in mind that this agreement is up for review and modification every two years, we arrive at the beginning of the main body of this agreement...

 I'm sure you've heard all the complaints about how this agreement is limited to 10 years and doesn't go beyond, but after you've read the Preface and Preamble, you now know that such a complaint is horsehockey most likely committed by those who skipped over stuff AND who are counting on YOU to not read the document yourself, because you trust this particular group of butt trumpets for no better reason than they can claim membership in the political party you favor.  In short, you put your trust in deliberately-ignorant politicians who presume that you're just as ignorant as they are.

The following screenshots are going to include the PDF page number designation because we're going to branch off from the main document when it refers to the Annex sections or other documents, thus:

Annex I begins on PDF page 21.

...and Annex I specs are detailed in Annex 5.  The heading for Annex 5, the Implementation Plan annex, can be found at the bottom of page 152.

The section of Annex I which deals with enrichment is section F, on page 27.

Oh the wailing and gnashing of teeth over the next shot... therefore I shall repeat what I said about the Preface simply because I know that the wailing tooth gnashers are going to fail to mention it:  these terms are subject to review and revision every TWO years.

I am now going to raise the issue of navigating this document in linear fashion, something to avoid because of its branch-off referrals to this or that Annex.  The reader would be best served by reading each Annex referenced, each time in the main body that a reference to an Annex is encountered. Non-linear navigation, not linear reading, is essential for understanding this document.

What the first paragraphs of section F in Annex I look like, on p. 27:

I can't say that I recall any pundit mentioning that this document sets down prescriptions for individual specific facilities, and it's worthwhile noting that considerable modification of those specific facilities are agreed to, and this is of importance to both Annex I and Annex V--and that's at the very least.  Those items are clearly the items that the nuclear experts were called in to set in the following screenshot where the technological nuclear limits are put in place, followed by section B addressing the Arak facility specifically.

The section on Arak's heavy water processing prohibits further pursuit of heavy water reactors, saying that Iran agrees to only light water reactors for power generation.

As a matter of fact, Annex I begins with addressing the Arak facility:

Well well--it looks like the members of the U.N. are on board, but we already know which faction of Congress hates the very idea of a U.N., now, don't we.  The EU, a party to the Iran Deal, is already making plans to progress from there regardless of the rumblings in the U.S. Congress as if they don't matter at all. LINK to France 24 report

I'm just now hearing about how AIPAC is big time upset, as Israelis at home are riled, and someone made the remark that there's no schedule of inspections anywhere in the document as if you can schedule stuff before they're agreed to and the IAEA is just so much chopped liver even though they ARE mentioned in the document regarding inspections.  

Page 7 talks about IAEA "continuous monitoring", you idiots, and it's covered in items N thru S of Annex I starting on page 39. And there's a whole Annex III addressing this issue. Anybody look at Annex IV yet? It puts the U.S. on a Joint Commission to oversee stuff and to yank this agreement means taking the U.S. off of the Commission.

Here's the deal, all you who whine about leading from behind--you're getting behind and the world already has contingency plans to move forward without the U.S. just in case you prevail in the U.S.  You won't be leading from behind, let alone from in front, because you'll be in no position to be leading at all when the rest of the world leaves you in the dust. The best you can hope for is to just catch up to where everybody else is.

The U.S. wasn't dealt many face cards in this poker game, folks. All the cards it can play are sanctions and a U.N. veto, which doesn't mean much if the E3/EU+3 goes forward with it outside the U.N. AIPAC can come crying to big daddy Washington and big daddy can't do much about it.


Resuming to read the main body of the agreement on page 7...

The above makes one wonder why the opposition is harping on 10 years, which should be, in their view, longer. Well, here you have something covered for 15 years and they deftly avoid mentioning this.  And we're not just talking about Arak anymore, either--Natanz and Fordow now join the agreement.

Annex I addresses Fordow specifically in area H beginning at the bottom of page 30.This section talks about repurposing Fordow from an enrichment facility to a research facility and method of storing decommissioned equipment--

Okay--now back to the main body--we now find ourselves on page 8:

Notice the reference to The Joint Commission near the bottom. If Congress attempts to negate this agreement, the U.S. doesn't get to be part of that Joint Commission as mandated in Annex IV. Back to page 8...

...and continued on page 9...

Once again there are references to other areas in the document that are out of sequence to the main body, so I will repeat this as often as necessary: the numbers on the pages might be sequential, but this document is non-linear and requires jumping around to different sections much like sheet music uses codas.  Reading each page in sequence just doesn't cut it.

Side note: Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1 section of Annex I is on page 38, and so is the section of Past and Present Issues of Concern.

Onward to the next page of the main body, page 10:

Once again, the Chicken Littles whining about "only 10 years" have been proven to be mere butt trumpets, and once again we need to flip forward to see what Annex I actually spells out. We also see why people looking for the word "inspection" aren't going to find it. In this document, it's called "monitoring".  We thus arrive at the end of page 10--

...and as was pointed out before, Annex IV covers the institution of the Joint Commission, of which the U.S. is specified as a member, and without this agreement agreed to by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. will have no place on this Commission.

Onward to page 11--

This specifies by citation which sanctions should be lifted SIMULTANEOUSLY with the imposition of restrictions, not only with direction to flip forward to Annex V but with the qualification of a footnote we would be wise to check at this time.  It's found on page 21, just before you get to the text of Annex I.

Ya, I can picture all the debate that the footnote disclaimer's gonna cause, but that's only among those who have actually read the document before they jump to conclusions. Precious few of those in Congress.  We also know that the Annex which details sanctions is Annex II; Annex V details implementation of the agreement.  Now back to page 11--

People whining about the lifting of current sanctions invariably fail to read the part about how they're lifted simultaneously with the implementation of this agreement subject to IAEA verification (again, the word "inspection" eludes those who are looking for it).

I will now make a comment on the structure of this document and its non-linear architecture: it's ingenious in terms of how, if the U.S. Congress kicks up a fit and rejects those parts describing what the U.S. role is, just a few sections can be rewritten to write out the U.S. and implemented anyway, and that's even with a U.S. veto power exercised in the U.N. The deliberation put into its design is nothing short of brilliant.

Now, where were we?  Ah yes, page 11 going into page 12...

Item 13 (xiii) is highlighted to show that under monitoring supervision would be these common methods for evading detection: false flags and wrong labeling.  Onward to the end of page 12...

...and continued on page 13, with a better screenshot of the transition from page 12 to page 13...

Highlighted in the screenshot immediately above is the meticulous detail this document goes into, as a number of its pages are devoted to listing specific banks, people, equipment.

In the next screenshot, I red-line the item that all of us individuals are going to feel the result of, right there in your own homes, because it affects the oil market right down to the price you pay at the pump:

And to think stuff was already getting complicated.  Here's a reminder that this agreement is between Iran and the E3/EU+3 without the United States directly being a party to the agreement as such. As an ally and major power in the  U.N., there is a U.S. role but only as outlined in the Annexes, to which the main body of the agreement refers to on occasions such as this one.

...and the path for the feds to encourage the state and local level is via their elected representatives in Congress, something that the E3/EU+3 is already painfully aware of, as evidenced by the contingency architecture of the document's mechanisms.

Voila page 15's paragraph (ends on page 16) which illustrates just how painfully aware the EU, again treated as a separate and primary party to the agreement, is aware of the unreliability of Congress:

Onward, where the EU and the U.S. are treated together, page 16:

Next paragraph, the U.S. is excluded, and in the paragraph following, gets re-included:

...and then the U.S. is excluded again...

Oh I know--two different sets of laws demand two different treatments. That's not what's happening here, though--what's happening here are stand-alone provisions in the event of a problematic U.S. Congress. These are contingency provisions.

Now notice the wording in the next screenshot--it's all about the EU with others, on the side, and just in one paragraph:

Annex III begins on page 135, and covers Civil Nuclear Co-operation.

Yes, more curious wording. It's the E3/EU+3 that are the primary parties to the agreement with Iran and everybody else are just "participants".  The U.S. has veto power in the UN Security Council, but that's about it--the deal is STILL between the E3/EU+3 and Iran regardless.  If the U.S. should pull out of participation, it pulls out of its supervisory role, too, not to mention be derelict in its NATO and other similar commitments to allies.

Now here's where things get a big quirky, and in fairness to the opposition, a case could be made that the U.S. needs better terms in the form of being more of a party to this than just being classified as "other" because, at best, the most say the U.S. has under this agreement is to sit on a panel of others as an arbiter, not sole arbiter, of a dispute:

That looks like the "snap-back" provision I've heard about. The rest of the paragraph shows that the "snap-back" occurs on both the EU side and Iran's side:

...and this brings us to the footnotes that precede Annex I as cited before. The text of the main body is short; the remainder are the Annexes etc.

It's worthwhile to repost a reminder these terms are still up for review and revision  every TWO years.

(To be continued...) Seriously.  The Annex section begins on page 21 so there's only a few more pages of the main body yet to be covered by this blog.  Stay tuned!
I was thinking that I should post the entirety of the texts of the Annexes but had, at this point decided against that because a link to the PDF of the entire text is provided at the outset of this post, and if you're reading this post, you're literate enough to read those for yourselves.  It turns out that there are a number of points to be made in posting those Annexes with the points highlighted, so I'll resume this post, further down, with a section on the Annexes...still a work in progress, to be continued.

Worthwhile editorials on this topic:
Blog post by Shibley Telhami, Brookings Institute
OpEd by Ami Ayalon, Times of Israel
Story about Ami Ayalon's opinion
And in the Jewish Daily Forward
Even the Saudis are on board now
White House statement
Article in New China
An astute geopolitical-economic take--Paul Craig Roberts

The Annexes

Annex I-----titled "Nuclear-related measures"----- begins on page 21. Sections:
     A:     General     page 21
     B:     Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor     page 21
     C:     Heavy Water Production Plant     page 24
     D:     Other Reactors     page 25
     E:     Spent Fuel Reprocessing Activities      page 25
     F:     Enrichment Capacity     page 27
     G:     Centrifuges Research and Development     page 28
     H:     Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant     page 30
     I:     Other Aspects of Enrichment     page 33
     J:     Uranium Stocks and Fuels     page 34
     K:     Centrifuge Manufacturing     page 37
     L:     Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1     page 38
     M:     Past and Present Issues of Concern     page 38
     N:     Modern Technology and Long Term Presence of  IAEA     page 39
     O:     Transparency Related to Uranium Ore Concentration (UDC)     page 40
     P:     Transparency Related to Enrichment    page 41
     Q:     Access     page 42
     R:     Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency     page 43
     S:     Other Uranium Isotope Separation Activities     page 44
     T:     Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device    page 45 
             List of applicable footnotes are on page 50
             Attachment about the concept of the modification of the Arak reactor, in detail, is on page 46

Annex II-----titled "Sanctions"----- begins on page 50
     A: The European Union     page 51
     B: The United States     page 61
            List of footnotes, names, banks, other organizations are on pages 70 - 73.
             Asterisk footnote on page 135.
Annex III-----titled "Civil nuclear co-operation"----- begins on page 135
     A:     General     page 135
     B:     Reactors, Fuels and Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes     page 136
     C:     Research and Development (R&D) Practices     page 139
     D:     Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Security     page 140
     E:     Nuclear Medicine and Radioisotopes, Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes      page 142
     F:     Waste Management and Facility Decommissioning     page 143
     G:     Other Projects     page 144
              No footnotes.

Annex IV-----titled "Joint Commission"----- begins on page 144

     1:     Establishment, Composition and Coordinator     page 144
     2:     Functions     page 145
     3:     Procedures     page 147
     4:     Decisions     page 147
     5:     Other     page 148
     6:     Procurement Working Group     page 148
     7:     Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting     page 152
               No footnotes.

 Annex V-----titled "Implementation plan"----- begins on page 152

     A:     Finalisation     page 152
     B:     Adoption Day     page 153
     C:     Implementation Day     page 154
     D:     Transition Day     page 157
     E:     UNCR Termination Day      page 158
     F:     Other     page 159
             List of applicable footnotes are on page 159

Notes on Annex I:

Notice that, once again, this is a deal between the E3/EU+3 and Iran with NO mention of the  U.S. and thus the U.S. has no say in whether or not the agreement on the whole goes forward if it's what the E3/EU+3 wants to go forward.  The U.S. role is strictly supervisory with sanction requirements, so if the entirety of the U.S. Congress wants out, then it wants out of its position as supervisor.  Sanction relief is what the U.S. has to agree to in order to maintain its ability to supervise.  Again, verification is the word that supplants the word "inspection" for those who whine about the fact that the word "inspection" in any of its forms doesn't appear in this document.
The U.S. conceivably works with the Working Group with the proviso that the remainder of the group agrees to it, and it is necessarily part of the Joint Commission, but because the JCPOA is between just the E3/EU+3, it is subject to the satisfaction of the EU+3 with this "snap-back" provision.

The following is just a short list of the advantages the U.S. loses of if Congress succeeds with its tantrum-throwing...

And then there's this:
Again--"monitoring", not "inspection".  Continuous monitoring doesn't involve scheduling because it's ongoing.

That doesn't sound like "just 10 years" to *me*.  Does the next section sound like "just 10 years" to you?
We've finally arrived at one part that I do have a problem with, and it's highlighted and underscored in red:

The problem I have with the red highlighted/underscored part is the fact that this is in English, expected to be translated into Farsi and sticklers for proper English grammar will catch this problem right off the bat even though in common usage, this wording will be interpreted to mean what I'm sure this document's author meant to say.

But legalese with improper English wording = loophole more often than not, and I would be happier if the sentence read--

"For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate only hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol."
I'm sure you now can see how this can cause a problem especially in translation given that there's no common-usage English among those who don't commonly speak English and the difference in meaning between the two versions is rather drastic.

Moving on...

(Since the following numbered paragraphs are items on the list set forth by item 29, I will highlight those numbers in color...)
The IAEA isn't going to just take Iran's face-value word for it that a centrifuge needs replacement; they will independently establish that a centrifuge is in such a state that it needs replacement.
Here we go with the bad English again, but in a paragraph where similar language is actually correct, grammatically.  The offending phrase has been redlined:
Once again it's worthwhile to point out that where the span of 10 years is mentioned, it's only (exclusively) about certain steps/conditions of this document and not a rule of thumb as proclaimed by some among the opposition. I just heard the Israel ambassador claim that Iran gets to have "new-kyew-lar weapons" after 10 years that that's flat out bullshit.

Exclusive, specific conditions applied to downsized equipment such as...

Below, one can clearly see that Israel's fuss over some kind of 10 year bullshit proves unfounded:
Below, I have a problem with a phrase which indicates that there has been no arrangement established at the point of approval of this document nor how such an agreement may be supervised by the E3/EU+3, Joint Commission, or anybody...

The next screenshot basically addresses formal reporting, and one item of action which ensues AFTER the 10th year mentioned in previous paragraphs, with Israel officials insisting that what comes after year 10 is a nuclear arsenal...

Seriously. Israel keeps bloviating because it's certain that it has a great number of gullible suckers it can snooker, enough to influence any congressional vote--except that influencing Congress still won't get 'em where they want to go because, as I've said, this agreement is between Iran and the E3/EU+3 and not with the U. S. as a named party to the agreement.
I need to interject a comment here at the page break although the section isn't completely displayed here yet, and that is the ability that the E3/EU+3 has for monitoring entities outside of Iran with the possible exception of Russia, which could pose as a wild card in this deck, given its behavior on exhibit via its belligerence with Ukraine.  Moving on...

Again--monitoring supply lines outside of Iran amounts to monitoring attempts to divert to undeclared programs/sites.

Bit of a typo in that second line--somebody forgot that 2 years is plural, ha.
Next--here we go again with the bad English...

I marvel that the Israel ambassador was all lathered up about some 10 year mark while skipping over this 8 year mark...
Next, we branch off into a number of other sections:
...and more branch-offs...

In a number of spots in this document are references to a "Safeguards Agreement", text of which isn't included in this document.  That's because it's mentioned in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the bailiwick of the IAEA. So although the last two screenshots may be puzzling, especially the apparent self-references to Article 17b which can't be found here either, these really are references to provisions in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and whomever wrote this document would do well to grasp a better command of English to make that clear.  What this does imply, though, is that this document requires Iran to sign onto the Non-Proliferation Treaty in addition to this agreement, and so far I haven't heard ANYBODY in government making clear that this is the case, and it's an important case to make--especially to Israel who clearly doesn't understand that by this agreement, Iran ALSO signs on to the NPT.

The screenshot above clearly illustrates yet another reason why complaining about any lack of an inspection schedule is a BS canard--monitoring technology sophisticated enough to also log and report hacking attempts.  Oh I know--the first objection to relying on technology for ongoing monitoring is the  hacking issue, but the first presumption in error on that one is the presumption of digital-only communication over the internet without considering good ole fashioned redundant microwave telemetry, for example.  A hacker would have to hack multiple channels exactly the same way to avoid detection.  And that's not the only method out there. Technology is NOT confined to digital Internet only.

Next--in red highlight are what I consider "weasel words" but again, we must keep in mind the Preamble and Preface terms, most important of which is the specified biennial review/revision of the terms of this agreement.

Now, unless the U.S. has diplomatic relations with Iran, it won't send IAEA inspectors from the U.S. anyway...which brings us back to the significant detriment that a colicky Congress can pose if it seeks to pull the U.S. out of this agreement.  It'll still go forward and the U.S. will be in a position of becoming blind when it comes to looking into what's going on in Iran, setting the remainder of the EU+3 in a global leadership position with the U.S. leading nobody anywhere, let alone being in a position to "lead from behind".  Even that would be off the table.

Next, same type of bad English strikes again but this time with important loophole creation with relation to the rest of the phraseology as also highlighted in red...
At this point it's reasonable to conclude that this document is in dire need of a rewrite just to polish up not just the repeated instances of bad English but also to clean up the inconsistent, squirrely numbering/itemization schema and definitely to add some sort of Table of Contents or Index.

In the next screenshot we see two things irking the agreement's opponents--the deliberate omission of anything covering Iran's military, and the agreement to keep secret what's deemed under U.S. law as Intellectual Property.  The fact is, that, with all this aforementioned continuous monitoring which includes intelligence instrumentation, the military gets no access to manufacturing supplies even if it did have its own secret facility.  Ya can't fly without supply.

The next screenshot provisions cover this area of undeclared things, but IMHO rather weakly...but...keeping in mind that it could be revised in two years OR ELSE a "snap back"...

Splitting hairs is invited here, especially if an undeclared activity or facilities fall under military operations.  But there is that "snap back" provision, and the prospect of review/revision every 2 years to deal with whatever squabbles may crop up.  After a 2 year period, one would have to wonder if Iran would think that risking a "snap back" to what we already know are painful trade conditions for Iran would  be a wise move.  As time goes by and Iran enjoys more international involvement as an equal instead of a pariah, going back to the bad old days would look more and more distasteful.  But I do realize that I'm presuming Iran to be reasonable, and that's still a question that the jury is still out on.

Nonetheless, Iran has a model to look to as to what life could be like if it decided to nix the agreement and proceed regardless of sanction snapbacks and all: North Korea.  If Iran reneges, then it has an insatiable appetite for becoming another North Korea.
Now, recall that the U.S. would be a member of the Joint Commission, with 7 other members, and if Congress nixes U.S. participation in this agreement, it would be powerless to have any say in the following:
Next, once again the word "inspection" isn't used, but overt "surveillance" infers continuous monitoring, something no inspection, however frequent, can't manage. Monitoring is far better than inspection although via the access clauses, IAEA personnel can inspect as well. This agreement agrees to both.

...and note the bit about 20 years. 20 years isn't the 10 years whined about by opponents.

I have to wonder how the word "namely" translates into Farsi especially given that its definition in English isn't terribly exacting, either.  "All" means "every", and "namely" puts a limit on what "all" means. If there is a particular interest in these particular pieces of equipment, then the word "particularly" should be used, while making it clear that this means itemization priority in addition to whatever else "all" covers.  It's why the phrase "including but not limited to" is often used.
Aha, a footnote. The footnote of detailed specifications, as it happens.

Yeah--as I said, the numbering in this document is really very squirrelly.  But explosive nuclear devices? We have a section for that right here.  But also notice that the Joint Commission wants the ability to approve certain aspects of this type of activity, subject to monitoring. Again, the word "inspection" was avoided, and I suspect it's because it's more limited than monitoring by whatever means, including various surveillance types, would be.  Why limit yourself to just inspections only, hm?

Now--opponents have grossly misrepresented the following part, which is an attachment to Annex I:
The whining about this section was about how Iran gets to keep its reactors, intending to convey that they're the same reactors in current form when that's simply NOT the case at all.

It's clear that this section was written by nuclear technical experts and so I'll just post the remaining text, omit the chart, and simply highlight where it references other sections of this document without further comment.

Here's a screenshot of the Annex I footnotes:

....and thus we arrive at Annex II.

Notes on Annex II:

This section cross-references a number of external documents and we start off with not just one but two footnotes right off the bat, so after I post the next screenshot to show what I mean, I'll then post a screenshot of the footnotes. I won't highlight references to the external documents, just cross-references to what's in THIS document, elsewhere.

There are a lot of footnotes to this section, by the way.  Here are the first two and they already set the tone as a disclaimer of sorts...

Now back to where we left off at the top of Annex II, where the nonsensical enumeration takes over again...

Ya, one would have to follow the EU legislative process to follow all that, but it's noteworthy that there is a section to Annex II which is devoted entirely to the United States.  You would think, though, if whomever typed this up saw reason in separating the paragraphs, they would have also seen reason to give each its own unique number for citation/reference. But noooooo....
Footnote 3:

The next screenshot shows the other elephant in the room, and I'll wager a much bigger reason why Congress is keen on killing the whole thing in its entirety (as if they could, which they can't--this section deals with the EU exclusively) because of the number of congressmen who are invested in Big Oil which profits on the high price of the global petroleum market which has been bolstered by the absence of Iranian oil for so many years.  When sanctions get lifted just by the EU alone, Big Oil loses wealth, as will British Petroleum given that the UK has been on-some, off-some, regarding being a member of the EU, and it's reasonably conceivable that members of Parliament would oppose this deal and for the same petrol reason.
I think it's abundantly clear at this point that the whole notion of "Annex" in a document is a European thing; whomever wrote this was a European, which goes a long, long way to explain the peculiar enumerations of paragraphs.  But it's also clear from this particular Annex that paragraphs are identifiable by their own unique numerical designations and yet the paragraphs here lack such  obvious unique numerical identification as the paragraphs in other documents it refers to.  Strange indeed.

Here's a part of the EU section that would impact whatever list the U.S. has, and that's the ban list.  What the EU un-bans would weaken whatever bans the Congress keeps in place or adds to:

Footnote 4 reads...
Moving right along, we discover references to what doesn't match with the squirrelly numbered sections in this document and if this is to an outside document, it doesn't say...
Now, why am I posting screenshots of a section that is exclusively EU applicable?  Because even though the mechanics of this agreement is structured in a manner that can exclude U.S. participation, it would do well to persuade the U.S. to participate AND it's in the best interest of the U.S. to participate because of loopholes the EU has put into the document that would be given free rein without U.S. participation, to the detriment of both the U.S. and global security as well--and what follows is a screenshot of a good case in point:
Now, how the dickens does the EU propose to prove that any given ship is not carrying prohibited items without inspection, hm? Surveillance monitoring of vehicles of transportation isn't anywhere near as feasible as it is with immobile facilities. Yup, this part right here poses a serious problem entirely on the part of the EU, and if the U.S. Congress terminates U.S. participation, it can't say jack squat about it.

We now arrive at the section which addresses the U.S. separately, and right out of the gate we find a number of things cross-referenced, in need of location at this time:
...and so we consult these footnotes first, before proceeding any further...

Well--it's also clear at this point that any U.S. congressman who presumes to travel abroad for the purpose of lecturing the EU and/or Iran on the rudiments of how the U.S. government works accomplishes nothing else but making  a complete ass of him/herself.  Now back to the Annex, where we first need to establish the nature of the aforementioned Attachment...and Annex II goes straight into Annex III right after the footnotes without any Attachments at all. That is SIGNIFICANTLY problematic.  The last paragraph of Annex II ends where the footnotes begin on page 70 with no Attachments, and the footnotes end with footnote number 17 on page 73 under which is an SDN List which extends uninterrupted all the way to page 135 where Annex III begins--no Attachments inserted between those either.  Here's the screenshot of the portion in question on page 73...

...and here's the screen shot of the pertinent portion on page 135...

The name at the top, in all caps, is the last name on the SDN List that is part of footnote number 17. At this point I do have to wonder if the copy of the agreement that I'm using for this posting is even legit because of all the faults such as bad English, bad  numbering system, and blatant omissions like this one really falls below any international standards to be expected in treaty-level documents.  Seriously, people.

Well, back to the Annex...

Now to hunt up footnotes 8 and 9...

...and to review footnote 3...
Back to where we left of in Annex II...

We now revisit the elephant in the room, the one big reason why major shareholders in Big Oil howl about how this is a bad deal...

What sane U.S. congressman is going to vote against his/her own invested financial interest, not just in share holdings but that lobby money, hm?  That's what renders this and the remainder of 4.3 on the whole be considered a no-go deal-killer proposition...
I'll bet that you could bet the farm that Netanyahu is heavily invested in big oil and that's why he's all to willing to scream about how bad a deal this is, even if it means Iran can't get nuclear weapons like he was complaining about earlier.  No major investor in Big Oil looks forward to Iranian oil on the market to drive the per-barrel price down to diminish current levels of wealth. Boo hoo.

...and footnote 10 says...

Resuming the Annex...

Now let's look at the footnotes...

Resuming with the Annex, anticipating more footnotes...

...and the footnote....

...moving on... the footnotes...

...and we've already discussed footnote 17, which is the SDN List. Now back to the Annex text...

Ah, yes, again with the energy and petrol biz...

It's really no accident that the loudest protesters against this agreement are by and large the same people who thought invading Iraq was a good idea--you know, the Halliburton Boys.

...and we already know that footnote 17 is a names list.  But let's pause here for a moment and consider how big a problem that Iranian oil and gas is on the profit margins of Big Oil, already whining about how natural gas used as a petrol alternative has put a significant dent in the global oil market because of a glut.  Consider also how the loudest critics are our old Halliburton Boys from the previous administration.  Add to that the Eurozone's stated intention, in the 1990s, to usurp the dollar as an oil market benchmark currency with the Euro.  Not a whole lot of people remember the discussion in the mid 90s when the U.S. scoffed at the Euro, but this was the discussion on the table just prior to the Euro's launch and the Eurozone has gained a whole lot of economic vigor since the 1990s regardless of its difficulties with Greece.

It basically strong-armed Greece into submission and now Greece's ex-finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, has been charged with treason for caving in to the Eurozone against the will of Greece's voters.

Here's yet another reminder that this #IranDeal is between the E3/EU+3 and Iran, not between Iran and specifically the U.S.  And the Eurozone is feeling its oats, with no love lost for the dollar or U.S. domination of the oil market. This is a deal that the U.S. doesn't lead, from either in front or from  behind.

...and that last paragraph brings us to the section full of footnotes.  With no Attachments. The Attachment associated with Annex I was on pages 46 thru 50, so this is where Annex II Attachments should be.  I can't say that I approve of this agreement until AFTER I've read ALL of it.  The absence of these Attachments isn't helping make the case.

Onward to Annex III.

Notes on Annex III:

The next screenshot is a real head-scratcher...

1, 2, 2,...wut

Doing a double take on that...

Yeah, I still don't get that one.  Onward...

...and we actually did find that Attachment, at the end of Annex I and before Annex II got started.
Moving right along...

The opposition makes a big deal about how the U.S. is fixin' to shovel a lot of money to Iran who will use that money to blow on Hesballah and whatever terrorist funding without paying attention to the above item number 5, and does not take into consideration Iran's role in fighting ISIS, preferring instead to make sure Iran can't fight anybody including ISIS...which is bollocks in MY book.

The next screen shot shows a number of important pursuits with nuclear technology that neither opponents or proponents have raised, and I'm guessing that research for the advancement of mankind's sciences just doesn't occur to anybody as terribly important. However, *I* think they're what's *most* important...

Seriously--issues of adamantly insisted absolute sovereignty aren't easily relinquished as can be seen in numerous cases around the globe, and certainly in Greece in re: the EU bailout--but also among the sticklers in the U.S. who persist in proclaiming absolute States' Rights as if the Articles of Confederacy were some sort of success with no need for a federalized Constitution.  If you're going to live well with your neighbors, you have to recognize that absolute sovereignty gets in the way of a lot of co-operative things like trade and the advancement of science, and so the EU has to come to grips of the improvement that a configuration more like a United States of Europe is more advantageous even to Greece but relinquish some aspects of absolute sovereignty is necessary.  And so we're looking at an Iran that seeks to join the global community while noticing the consequences of NOT doing so in the form of poster boy North Korea which stubbornly insists on absolute sovereignty to the point of living with isolation from the other nations on this planet.

Moving on...

  Seriously--making different paragraphs the same damn number is a seriously effed up way of doing business.  Seriously.  Onward...

Brace yourself for redundancies and one typo...
Now notice how the language changes to exclude the possibility of other states participating...
...may include a medical nuclear manufacturing license which would help with global supply available to the global medical community...

This brings us to the end of Annex III, which had neither footnotes or Attachments.

Notes on Annex IV:

We now arrive at the section where the U.S. role is more spelled out--a section that *should* make opponents come to the realization that pulling the U.S. out of this agreement also means pulling the U.S. out of whatever leadership role it might enjoy even if it is a co-equal member of the EU+3.  Opponents should also realize by this section that, because the U.S. is just one of a number of nations in the group EU+3, pulling the U.S. out of this agreement will not keep the agreement from going forward, with only slight modification to account for the absence of the U.S., which will cease to be in a position to supervise the Iran deal going forward.

To review, Section B of Annex I is on page 21.
===================================(Reviewing Annex I Section B)===

The reason for the red highlight at the time of its posting was to point out that the U.S. was not a named party in this agreement--only the group the U.S. belonged to, as I was making the point that the absence of the U.S. in the EU+3 would NOT prevent the agreement from going forward.  Continuing the review, keeping in mind that this Annex also has an Attachment...

.....and the Attachment...

...including a lengthy chart of technical specifications.  We now resume regular programming, ha.


Resuming where we left off in Annex IV, describing the functions of the Joint Commission...

More problems in the cross-referencing.  In Annex I, Additional Protocol section, L, on page 38, begins with paragraph number 64.  Now what?  This screenshot best makes the case that no two paragraphs should have the same number.  If  I were a congressman, I would say that I agree with the principles of this document but I could not vote to approve it as written.  This thing is in dire need of a re-write just to clean it up.  Anyhoo--

Paragraph 21 in Annex I comes under section E, Spent Fuel Reprocessing, on page 25, where I made note of bad English...

...however, what was cited was "Annex I of  the Additional Protocol" and it's still possibly a reference to a completely different, outside document, hinted at being the case here in this screen shot of the top of page 26.  I did, earlier, express the opinion that this was actually a reference to a section in the Non Proliferation Treaty, but this document again fails to make that clear.  The previous mention in terms of a Safeguards reference was quite clear that it was a reference to the NPT but not without additional research to establish that as a fact.

Just to be clear on the record, on this blog: the missing Attachments and paragraphs are a completely separate issue from the public bruhaha over lack of access to documents regarding agreements between Iran and the IAEA. What I'm complaining about is basically unforgivable sloppiness in assembling this present agreement.

Another article about transparency issues with IAEA & Iran , unrelated to this post, in case you're interested.

There does appear to be an indirect connection between the cryptic reference in this document I'm posting about and the current bruhaha in the form of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that the IAEA is involved with, and DOES mention research of a sensitive nature, precluding publication insofar as it's the work of a European consortium.  Hmmm....

Those of you who have returned to this post to see what's been added, I've paused at this particular spot because I'm still trying to hunt up the cross-references.  Looks like I'll be a good while at it.

Ah yes--I found THIS pertinent document, as it happens.  More to come as I dig stuff up, so by all means, stay tuned.

Now back to Annex IV...where we encounter an additional reference: paragraph 26 of Annex I.  To review that particular citation, here's that paragraph:

...and it makes reference to paragraphs 43, 44, and 46...

What of paragraph 46?  Well, because of the squirrelly numbering problem, we really don't know WHICH paragraph 46 they're talking about.  Whomever drew up that document like this should be fired yesterday and the whole document rewritten in clearer form according to commonly understood standards.
...and we've reached the end of the multiple paragraphs all claiming to be paragraph 46.

NOW we can resume where we left off on page 146. Whew.

...and we run into a cross reference to paragraph 59 of Annex I.  To review, with red highlighting what's exclusively Russia's purview...

Thankfully, there exists only one paragraph 59!

At this point, I've been elsewhere in cyberspace engaging in debate over this document as well as debunking what's been circulating as 21 talking points to argue against this agreement, most of which are flat out lies, interspersed with half-truths.  And much is now being made over Iran declaring that U.S. and Canadian inspectors will be banned from Iran as if Iran gets to dictate to others what the terms of this agreement have to be.

You good people who have been revisiting this post already know better than to swallow that shit because you good people already know that it's the E3/EU+3 (okay okay--aka P5+1. Same thing) have established and agreed to the provision that only inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran are permitted.  Neither the U.S. nor Canada fit that description, so this is simply a case where Iran spoke about one of the provisions we all agreed to in the #IranDeal in the first place.

Let's see, where were we?  Ah, yes...

Well, there's no good reason to repeat the entirety of Annex II here; I trust you've already read it by the time you get to this point in my blog post, and if you need to review it, you have but to scroll up from here to find it.  Those cross references to specific paragraphs, though, are a different case.  So, to review those...

The next screen shot of paragraph 78 is an important part of the dispute resolution framework constructed by this agreement, so heads up all you people who claim that Iran could just nonchalantly renege on the agreement without consequences, because the step that follows this step would be the "snap back":
We now revisit the old multiple-same-numbered-paragraphs with paragraphs 82.2 and 82.3 because there exists no such paragraphs thus designated--just a number of paragraphs all of which claim to be paragraph 82.  I'm guessing (and this has to be just a guess) that you have to count down to the paragraph 82 suggested by the number to the right of the decimal point which one is correct, because the text doesn't clearly establish that to be an indisputable fact...thereby inviting dispute:

Now back to where we were on page 146...

Now back to the insanity of numbering multiple paragraphs with the same number...

There ya go--the UN has confidentiality procedures, and THAT's what's driving opponents bonkers as they scream about "secret side deals" although the fact of the matter is that Congress has in situ access to view those details but because they're confidential, can't discuss those details in public.  What's the matter, whiners? All of a sudden you don't trust your duly elected congressman? For shame. Wotta bunch of morons.

Section 6 of this Annex is easy enough to scroll back to; as for Section Q of Annex I, well, here's a review, given that Section Q also addresses the confidentiality issue (here, highlighted in green):

The part in red is what Netanyahu likes to point at as the bad-deal-is-worse-than-no-deal, but this paragraph infers, without coming right out and saying it, that Iran ALSO signs on to the Non Proliferation Treaty, which DOES cover the military.  Therefore there's no need for this agreement to repeat the terms of the NPT.  Resuming...

(more bad English ahead....)
That last bit should be brought to the attention of people who whine about no U.S. inspectors in Iraq because they've got the Joint Commission which includes the U.S. with supply-side inspection capability.

Eight more pages to go, we're closing in on the end, folks...

Dispute resolution procedure wraps up Annex IV.  Next, the last Annex: Annex V, which starts right out of the gate with a footnote.  Stay tuned.

Notes on Annex V:
...which starts out with a footnoted title, footnote of which is a disclaimer:

...and the footnote is just a restatement of the first paragraph of the Annex. Who the hell wrote this thing?!
Yes, we've sidetracked to this Annex earlier, so consider this a review, then--but also consider the recently stated problems that Iran just voiced over the U.S. Congress reviewing those "side agreements" with the IAEA, given that this agreement's goal is for transparency even if the broader general public can't see these details...
With the noises that Iran has been making over the U.S. role in the P5+1, it has come to pass that opponents side with Iran (even Netanyahu sides with Iran) that the U.S. should pull out of the agreement.  How 'bout THEM apples.  The role that the U.S. has in this is review and oversight, part of which are IAEA reports submitted to the Joint Commission, which the U.S. is member of--unless Congress pulls the U.S. out of  the deal.

Now, the following are probably references to the Non Proliferation Treaty, but this document doesn't really spell that out....

Next is the portion that I'm sure will raise all kinds of howls from the Tea Party gallery of the GOP about an "imperial president", but hey--they're the same people who were trumpeting "separation of powers" not all that long ago...
Ya, there are a few things above that are already in dispute.

Well, we've thoroughly gone over Annex I more than once, so I'll spare you another go-over.  You can just scroll up to find the earlier analyses; as the disclaimer said, all this is just to set forth the sequence and the timing.  That's what the highlight in orange does for notable timing items.
...and as observed earlier, the sections highlighted in red are curiously absent from this PDF.
We've already discussed Annex II in depth, and noted the missing Attachments in this Annex.
Footnote 2 says...

Moving right along...
...and footnote 3 is another disclaimer...
Moving along, with a subsequent pause for an observation of something I think is highly important...

...and what I observe is the 8 years from Adoption day and the Big Whine about how, in 10 years, Iran gets nukes: Iran has to successfully complete the Transition period before 10 years expires regardless of what happens in 10 years. And the 15 year and 25 year hurdles remain. Although we've been hopping all over this non-linear document to make sense of it, Annex V has the purpose of setting forth a linear sequence of achievement events, in order.

Moving along...

What the United States agrees to do in the next screen shot is where things get dicey with Congress, so although this portion has been discussed earlier in this post, it's still worthwhile to do an examination of the noise Congress is currently making and the odd situation of being a Republican who claims to be pro-business and pro-Netanyahu/AIPAC...

The United States will seek such legislative action...
Seeking it fulfills the agreement; actually getting such legislation is a different story. The thing is that the EU is chomping at the bit to do business with Iran, and it's not like France and Russia aren't already ahead of the pack on that aspect.  To be against this deal is to be anti-business. Talk about an epic conflict of interest, huh--support for Netanyahu's idea of Israel pitted up against opening up a business market.

And what is Iran expected to do? One paragraph:

...and those are found in the Non Proliferation Treaty. Small paragraph, big hairy deal.

Basically, at the conclusion of the 10 year period, the UN Security Council gets off the hook. That's it. Sky isn't going to fall and Iran isn't going to get nukes.  The world isn't going to end in 10 years unless your whole world is the UN Security Council.  And so says the last bit of Annex V on the last page (159) of this document:

Actually, the European Union website has a much more coherent rendition of this agreement, but it's in different PDF sections, and even they don't have the Attachments to Annex II either.
European Union External Action site link, English

Now, until those missing Attachments show up somewhere,